

Unlawful restraint of a dog	HSC	821.079	\$0-\$500	821.079(c)	Enhanceable; Each dog unlawfully restrained is a separate offense
Allowing dog or coyote that is a danger to animals to run at large	HSC	822.012	\$0-\$100	822.012(b)	Each time animal runs at large is a separate offense
Unprovoked attack by dangerous dog causing bodily injury (owner penalty)	HSC	822.044	\$0-\$500	822.044(b)	Dog may also be destroyed
Failure to comply with owner requirements for a dangerous dog	HSC	822.045	\$0-\$500	822.045(b)	Enhanceable
Owning a dangerous wild animal without a certificate of registration for that animal	HSC	822.113; 822.103	\$0-\$500	822.113(c)	
Failure to display a certificate of registration for dangerous wild animal	HSC	822.113; 822.106	\$0-\$500	822.113(c)	
Failure to notify animal registration agency of any attack or escape by a dangerous wild animal	HSC	822.113; 822.110	\$0-\$500	822.113(c)	
Transferring ownership of a dangerous wild animal to a person without a required certificate of registration for that animal	HSC	822.113(b)	\$0-\$500	822.113(c)	
Failure to operate under animal shelter standards	HSC	823.003	\$0-\$500	823.003(f)	
Tampering with traps set for predatory animals or rodents	HSC	825.008	\$50-\$200	825.008(b)	
Stealing traps belonging to the state or Department of the Interior	HSC	825.009	\$100-\$200	825.009(b)	
Stealing predatory animals from traps	HSC	825.010	\$100-\$200	825.010(b)	
Failure to have a dog or cat vaccinated for rabies	HSC	826.022	\$0-\$500	826.022(b)	Enhanceable
Unauthorized use or sale of rabies vaccine	HSC	826.024	\$0-\$500	826.024(b)	
Failure to register a dog or cat	HSC	826.032	\$0-\$500	826.032(b)	
Failure to restrain a dog or cat	HSC	826.034	\$0-\$500	826.034(b)	
Failure to quarantine an animal	HSC	826.044	\$0-\$500	826.044(b)	
Violating rules governing area rabies quarantine	HSC	826.046	\$0-\$500	826.046(b)	
Operating a quarantine or impoundment facility that fails to meet standards	HSC	826.055	\$0-\$500	826.055(b)	
General penalty: Violating provisions regarding dog and cat sterilization under Chapter 828	HSC	828.010	\$0-\$500	828.010(b)	

## Class C misdemeanor offenses under state law

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEIZURE OF ANIMAL  
DUE TO ANIMAL CRUELTY

IN RE: § IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT  
[NAME OR DESCRIPTION] § CITY OF [NAME]  
OF ANIMAL(S) § [NAME] COUNTY, TEXAS

I, (name of Affiant), the undersigned Affiant, being an Animal Control Officer or Peace Officer for the City of [name], under the laws of the State of Texas, and being duly sworn, upon oath, makes the following statements for legal seizure under Section 821.022, Texas Health and Safety Code:

Seizure is requested of AN/ALL ANIMAL(S) that is/are being cruelly treated, in particular, [list manner(s) of cruel treatment, such as "tortured, seriously overworked, unreasonably abandoned, unreasonably deprived of necessary food, care, or shelter, cruelly confined, or caused to fight with another animal"];

Specifically including but not limited to:

[List type(s) of animal(s) and name(s) of animal(s), if known];

This/These animal(s) is/are currently located in the City of [name], [name] County, Texas at [location], which is under the control of [Owner's name]. The description of the premises is as follows: [description of location];

My belief of the foregoing is based on the following facts:

[List specifically how the animal(s) was/were being cruelly treated];

Wherefore, Affiant requests a warrant to seize said animal(s) in accordance with Section 821.022, Texas Health and Safety Code, and requests that a hearing be set within 10 calendar days in order to determine whether said animal(s) has/have been cruelly treated.

WITNESS, my signature this [ ] day of [ ], 20[ ]

\_\_\_\_\_  
AFFIANT

\_\_\_\_\_  
TITLE

P

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20--

---

Judge  
[City] Municipal Court  
[address of court]

INSPECTION AND SEIZURE WARRANT

IN RE: § IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT  
 [NAME OR DESCRIPTION § CITY OF [NAME]  
 OF ANIMAL(S)] § [NAME] COUNTY, TEXAS

## GREETINGS:

TO: (Name(s) of specific Animal Control Officer(s) or Peace Officer(s)); any Animal Control Officer; or any Peace Officer of the State of Texas:

Whereas, application in writing, under oath, has been made before me by [name of Affiant], a true and exact copy of which application is attached hereto and expressly incorporated herein and made a part hereof, and said application having stated facts and information in my opinion sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of this warrant.

Whereas, in accordance with Section 821.022, Texas Health and Safety Code, a seizure warrant may be issued to a peace officer or an officer who has responsibility for animal control in a municipality and has reason to believe that an animal has been or is being cruelly treated.

You are therefore commanded to enter (location) forthwith: to seize any cruelly treated animal(s), to inspect, to make note of findings, to take photographs of animals alleged to be/have been cruelly treated and conditions constituting alleged cruel treatment, and to give written notice to name(s) of Owner(s) the alleged owner(s) of said animal(s), that a hearing will be held in the [City] Municipal Court on the day of , 20--, at [time], in Courtroom located at [address of municipal court] to determine whether the animal(s) has/have been cruelly treated.

HEREIN FAIL NOT, but you have then and there this Warrant within three (3) days from its issuance with your return thereon showing how you have executed same.

HEREIN FAIL NOT, and due return make hereof to me the place above named.

NOW THEREFORE, you are ordered to execute this Warrant.

Witness my signature on the the day of , 20--.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Judge

[City] Municipal Court  
 [address of municipal court]

Came to hand on the same day issued, and executed on the [REDACTED] day of [REDACTED], 20[REDACTED], by seizing and impounding the following animal(s), believed by me to be the same animal(s) described in said warrant and affidavit, to-wit: [REDACTED] which was/were found at [REDACTED] in the possession of [REDACTED]; and I gave written notice of the hearing set forth in said warrant to [REDACTED], the alleged owner(s) of said animal(s), in obedience to the command of said warrant.

NO. 4909-D

<b>In re:</b>  <b>APPROXIMATELY 27,000 ANIMALS</b>  <b>SEIZED ON DECEMBER 15, 2009</b>	§ § § § §	<b>IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT</b>  <b>CITY OF ARLINGTON</b>  <b>TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS</b>
--	-----------------------	---

ORDER

Commencing on the 18th day of December and ending on the 31<sup>st</sup> day of December, 2009, a hearing was held in the above-styled and numbered cause before Associate Judge Michael Smith of the Arlington Municipal Court, sitting in his capacity as Magistrate. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether animals seized by the City of Arlington (hereinafter called "the City") on December 15, 2009 from Jasen Shaw, Vanessa Shaw, and U.S. Global Exotics, Inc. (hereinafter called "Respondents") at 1007 Oakmead Drive, Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas were "cruelly treated" as defined by Texas Health and Safety Code §821.021. The City was represented by Assistant City Attorneys Linda Frank, Asem Eltiar, and David Johnson. Respondents were represented by attorneys Lance Evans and Jim Jay.

**Background**

On December 15, 2009, Chief Judge Stewart Milner of the Arlington Municipal Court issued a warrant, as authorized by Texas Health and Safety Code §821.022, for the seizure of animals being housed at 1007 Oakmead Drive in Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas. The warrant was issued in response to an affidavit that had been filed by Mike Bass, an officer with the City who has responsibility for animal control. The testimony revealed that the total number of animals seized was approximately 27,000 and represented approximately 500 species. These animals were the inventory of a business operating under the name "U.S. Global Exotics," which buys and sells "exotic" animals.

At the time of this seizure, the City believed that Jasen and Vanessa Shaw were the owners of this business and the owners of the animals. A copy of the seizure warrant, which named Jasen and Vanessa Shaw as the animals' owners, together with written notice of the time and place of this hearing, was handed to Jasen Shaw when the animals were seized on December 15, 2009. At the hearing, it was shown that the business and animals are actually owned by a corporation called U.S. Global Exotics, Inc., and that Jasen Shaw is the president of that corporation.

The attorneys for Respondents argue that the owner of the animals, U.S. Global Exotics, Inc., was not properly made a party to this proceeding, since the seizure warrant did not mention this corporation by name. This Court does not agree with this contention, for the following reasons. There appears to be no statutory requirement that the application for the warrant, or the warrant itself, must contain the name of the owner. Texas Health and Safety Code §821.022 spells out the procedure to be followed when an authorized officer "has reason to believe that an animal has been or is being cruelly treated." Subsection (a) of that statute provides that the officer may apply to a magistrate for a warrant to seize the animal. Subsection (b) provides that upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the animal has been or is being cruelly treated, the magistrate "shall issue the warrant and set a time within 10 calendar days of the date of issuance for a hearing in the appropriate justice court or municipal court to determine whether the animal has been cruelly treated." Neither of these two subsections of the statute mentions the word "owner." This wording would seem to allow a concerned officer to take quick action for the welfare of an animal and "get the ball rolling" even in cases where the officer has been unable, or has not yet had time, to determine the exact ownership of the animal. Only in subsection (c) of §821.022 does the owner of the animal come into the picture, when the officer, upon executing the warrant, is required to "give written notice to the owner of the animal of the time and place of the hearing."

Since the owner of the animals in this case is a corporation, the statutes dealing with service of process on corporations must be followed in order to comply with the notice requirement just mentioned. Texas Business Corporation Act §2.11 provides "The president and all vice presidents of the corporation and the registered agent of the corporation shall be agents of such corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to

be served upon the corporation may be served.” Further, Texas Business Organizations Code §5.255 similarly provides that the president and each vice president of a corporation is an agent upon whom process, notice, or demand against the corporation may be served. In the present case, while the corporation U.S. Global Exotics, Inc. was not named anywhere in the warrant, the corporation’s animals were seized, and the corporation’s president, who was physically present, was personally handed a notice advising the time and place that a hearing on the treatment and eventual disposition of the animals was to be held. This Court finds that this service on the corporation’s president satisfied the notice requirement of Texas Health and Safety Code § 821.022(c).

### **Discussion of the Evidence**

Both sides presented witnesses during the hearing, and their combined presentations totaled seven days of testimony. The Court heard testimony from several expert witnesses as well as other fact witnesses and received into evidence photographs, videos, and documents. The Court heard argument from counsel for both sides. This evidence demonstrated the confinement, health, and condition of the animals at 1007 Oakmead Drive.

The evidence revealed that U.S. Global Exotics, Inc. is in the business of importing and selling “exotic” animals. One of the expert witnesses defined an “exotic” animal as an animal that is not a dog or cat or domesticated agricultural animal. This definition is broader than one might expect, and includes animals as familiar and common as hamsters, as well as very rare mammals, reptiles, arachnids, and amphibians. The witnesses who testified on this point were in general agreement that about 75-80% of the animals at the facility were “wild-caught,” meaning that they were trapped or otherwise captured in the wild and then sold. The balance of the animals came from farming operations that breed them for commercial purposes. The animals seized originally came from several continents. U.S. Global Exotics buys and transports these animals to its facility at 1007 Oakmead Drive, and then sells them to other dealers, pet stores, zoos, and private purchasers. Some of these sales are international, and others are domestic.

Several witnesses testified about the conditions they observed at the facility at 1007 Oakmead Drive. Dozens of photographs and a number of video and audio recordings were

received in evidence. Taken together, the evidence shows several ongoing problems which can be briefly summed up with the following observations.

- (1) The facility was seriously understaffed. At the time of the seizure, there were only three employees whose sole job duty was the care of the animals. Although Jasen and Vanessa Shaw and one or two other non-caretaker employees would sometimes assist, there was still far too little time and manpower available to care for such a large number of animals. Some of the witnesses who were employed at the facility testified that some of the rooms in which animals were housed did not even have a caretaker assigned to them. In those rooms, the animals' needs had to wait until one of the caretakers assigned to other rooms found time to come and check them. Among the experts who testified, opinions as to the number of employees that would be needed to care for this many animals ranged from 20 to 40.
- (2) All of the animals were subjected to poor air quality, with most of the witnesses describing a constant stench of death, and with one witness also describing a strong ammonia odor resulting from urine.
- (3) Many of the animals were housed in overcrowded conditions, including many types of animals that are solitary by nature and should not be forced into close proximity even with others from their own species. The testimony revealed that this overcrowding causes stress in animals, increases the incidence of fighting, injuries, and cannibalism, and facilitates the transmission of disease.
- (4) Many of the animals were unreasonably deprived of basic needs, such as food, water, clean bedding, and heat. In perhaps the worst example, one shipment of 414 iguanas was packaged in small groups in bags, and the bags were then packed in boxes for shipment to Egypt. A problem developed with the purchaser, and the order was eventually canceled. The iguanas were left in the shipping boxes for approximately two weeks, without food or water. When the boxes were opened, approximately 200 of the iguanas had died. While the testimony did not reveal any other situation as dramatic as this, inadequate supplies of food and water, as well as dead animals remaining in areas where live animals were confined, were ongoing, everyday problems that extended across all parts of the facility. In part, these problems resulted from the understaffing mentioned above.

For all of the above reasons, as well as others that were detailed in the testimony, at least four of the expert witnesses testified that all of the animals in the facility were cruelly treated.

Many animals died in the facility, but these deaths do not constitute conclusive evidence of cruel treatment. The testimony showed that at the time of the seizure, approximately 600 dead animals were found in Respondent's facility at 1007 Oakmead Drive. This statistic has received much publicity and might persuade the casual observer that Respondents are automatically to blame, but this Court finds that the evidence does not support such a view, any more than it supports the view that the City is automatically responsible for the deaths of the almost 4,000 animals that have died since the City took custody of them. As the City and Respondents have clearly and ably pointed out, when one acquires an animal, it may already have problems.

Firstly, evidence received at the hearing indicates that the death rate in the animal trade is generally high. One witness cited a study that indicated that as many as 70% of reptiles die before reaching their ultimate purchaser. The evidence further indicates that deaths in the animal trade can result from any of a number of factors. A high percentage of these animals are already carrying diseases and/or parasites which they had in the wild. Some of these diseases and parasites can be fatal. Many of the animals experience stress, which can result from being captured, from being transported, from temperature changes, or from other factors. This stress can be harmful to the animals' health and can result in death. Additionally, some animals simply stop eating. The evidence showed that cessation from eating can result from stress, from temperature changes, from simply being moved to another cage, and from any number of other factors, including some that cannot be determined. The evidence indicated that sometimes an animal that has stopped eating will eventually start eating again. In other cases, animals never resume eating and simply die. Finally, the treatment the animal received at the hand of the previous owner yesterday may have a very strong bearing on the condition it exhibits today. Because of all these factors, the evidence would not support a finding that all animal deaths in a facility such as U.S. Global's are the result of the treatment the animals are receiving there. It should also be noted that animals in the wild die from predators, disease, and any number of other factors. Whether a given animal would have a longer life expectancy in the wild than it would in the exotic animal trade must be left to conjecture.

The evidence also showed that U.S. Global's facility is intended to be only a temporary stopping point for the animals. As in any business that buys and sells any type of merchandise, quick turnover is desirable. This is especially true when the commodity involved is literally "perishable." At first glance, the Court finds some merit in the proposition that a facility that is being used as a temporary holding facility where animals are only briefly housed before being shipped to new owners might reasonably be held to a slightly lower standard than would a facility where the animals will be kept for an indefinite period. However, it was very common for an animal's stay at this facility to become longer than expected. Even if a lower standard of care were permissible for animals that are transient, no steps were taken by Respondents to insure that more intensive and generous care was given to those whose stay was being extended. Evidence was received which indicated that this facility was operated in accordance with industry standards of the exotic animal trade. While this may be true, this Court is not free to substitute those standards for the standards set by Texas statutes.

### **Findings**

Having considered the evidence and argument of counsel, this Court finds:

The jurisdictional requirements set forth in Chapter 821, Texas Health and Safety Code, have been met, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter.

The Respondents cruelly treated all of the animals made subject of this hearing by cruelly confining the animals.

In particular, all of the animals were cruelly treated in one or more of the following manners: cruelly confined and injured due to such confinement; unreasonably denied necessary food and water; subjected for an extended period of time to food and/or water contaminated with foreign substances including but not limited to feces and urine; held in enclosures inappropriate for the animals in size and design; overcrowded in enclosures; held in shipping containers for

extended periods of time without proper care, including but not limited to denial of necessary food, water, and veterinary care; subjected to conditions that promoted fighting and cannibalism; and denied necessary veterinary care.

Respondents failed to employ sufficient personnel to adequately care for the animals.

The City did not present any evidence detailing the costs incurred in housing and caring for the animals during their impoundment, so Respondents are not required to pay any such costs.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:**

Pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code § 821.023(d), U.S. Global Exotics, Inc., and, to the extent that they may have an ownership interest, Jasen Shaw and Vanessa Shaw, are hereby divested of ownership of the animals in question and deprived of all right, title and interest in the animals.

Pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code § 821.023(d), the City is given the animals and is ordered to sell the animals at a public sale by auction, have the animals humanely euthanized, or give the animals to a non-profit animal shelter, pound, or society for the protection of animals.

Respondent U.S. Global Exotics, Inc. is ordered to pay costs of court, including the costs of the transcript for appeal.

Let execution issue as necessary for enforcement of this order.

Signed on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_

---

**Michael Smith**  
**Judge Presiding**

DENIED  
m.g.s.  
1-15-10

CAUSE NO. 4909-D

IN RE	§	IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT
	§	
APPROXIMATELY 27,000 ANIMALS	§	CITY OF ARLINGTON
	§	
SEIZED DECEMBER 15, 2009	§	TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

**MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL**


COMES NOW LANCE EVANS, Attorney for JASEN SHAW, VANESSA SHAW, and U.S. GLOBAL EXOTICS, INC., Respondents in the above entitled and numbered cause, and moves the Court to grant a new trial for the following reasons:

I.

The trial court violated Respondents' rights to due process and due course of law under the United States and Texas Constitutions as well as their right to Jury Trial under the 7<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 15 of the Texas Constitution by denying Respondents' request for a jury trial in this matter.

II.

The evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings and judgment.



## III.

The trial courts findings and judgment are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

## IV.

The evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings and judgment.

## V.

The trial court violated Respondents' rights to due process and due course of law under the United States and Texas Constitutions by denying Respondents' Sworn Motion for Continuance.

## VI.

The trial court erred by denying Respondents' Motion for Plea in Abatement pursuant to Rule 21, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, because the Notice of Hearing did not name the actual owner of the seized animals at issue.

## VII.

The statute under which Judgment was rendered is unconstitutional because it denies Respondents procedural and substantive due process of law. Further, it constitutes an improper taking of property in violation the United States and Texas Constitutions.

## VIII.

The trial erred by admitting into evidence exhibits which were not properly authenticated and by improperly admitting hearsay.


## IX.

The trial court did not correctly apply the law to the facts.

## X.

The trial court erred by failing to make specific findings with regard to each specific animal seized that the particular animal was cruelly treated and, therefore, subject to seizure and/or forfeiture.

Respectfully submitted,





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LANCE T. EVANS, SBN 06723680  
 115 W. 2<sup>nd</sup> Street, Suite 202  
 Fort Worth, Texas 76102  
 817-332-3822  
 817-332-2763 Fax  
 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this the 15<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2010, a true copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal has been delivered to the City Attorney, 200 West Abram, Arlington, Texas 76004.




---

LANCE T. EVANS.

NO. 4909-D

IN RE: § IN MUNICIPAL COURT OF  
 APPROXIMATELY 27,000 ANIMALS § CITY OF ARLINGTON  
 SEIZED DECEMBER 15, 2009 § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW LANCE EVANS, Attorney for JASEN SHAW, VANESSA SHAW, and U.S. GLOBAL EXOTICS, INC., Respondents in the above entitled and numbered cause, and file this Notice of Appeal and in support thereof would show the court as follows:


I.


That on the 5<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2010, Associate Judge Michael Smith of the Arlington Municipal Court ruled that all animals seized on December 15, 2009 were cruelly treated and Jasen Shaw, Vanessa Shaw and U.S. Global Exotics, Inc. were divested of ownership of the animals seized on December 15, 2009 and deprived of all right, title and interest in the animals.

II.

Pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code, Section 821.025, the Respondents hereby give Written Notice of Appeal from said judgment to County Court at Law of Tarrant County, Texas.


Respectfully submitted,

  
 LANCE T. EVANS, SBN 06723680  
 115 W. 2<sup>nd</sup> Street, Suite 202  
 Fort Worth, Texas 76102  
 817-332-3822  
 817-332-2763 Fax  
 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this the 15<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2010, a true copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal has been delivered to the City Attorney, 200 West Abram, Arlington, Texas 76004.



---

LANCE T. EVANS

CAUSE NO. 4909-D

IN RE:	§	IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT
	§	
APPROXIMATELY 27,000 ANIMALS	§	CITY OF ARLINGTON
	§	
SEIZED DECEMBER 15, 2009	§	TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS


APPEAL BOND

WHEREAS, on the 5<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2010, in the above entitled and numbered cause, in said Court, Associate Judge Michael Smith ruled that all animals seized on December 15, 2009 were cruelly treated and Respondents JASEN SHAW, VANESSA SHAW and U.S. GLOBAL EXOTICS, INC. were divested of ownership of the animals seized on December 15, 2009 and deprived of all right, title and interest in the animals, and from which said judgment said Respondents appeal to the County Court at Law of Tarrant County, Texas pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code, Section 821.025.

THEREFORE, we, the undersigned, as principals, and as sureties, do hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, to the State of Texas, in the sum of TEN THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS (\$10,000.00).

CONDITIONED, that the above Respondents shall well and truly make a personal appearance before the County Court at Law of Tarrant County at its next regular term, to be held in Fort Worth, Texas, on the \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_, and there remain from day to day and term to term and answer in said cause on trial in said Court.

WITNESS OUR HANDS this 15<sup>th</sup> day of JAN., 2010.



WAIVED BY SURETY


JASEN SHAW

WAIVED BY SURETY


VANESSA SHAW

WAIVED BY SURETY

U. S. GLOBAL EXOTICS, INC. by Jasen Shaw, President


  
 LANCE T. EVANS / SB# 06723680  
 115 W. Second St., Ste. 202  
 Fort Worth, Texas 76102  
 (817) 332-3822

APPROVED and filed this 15 day of JAN., 2010


  
 JUDGE PRESIDING


THE STATE OF TEXAS §  
 TARRANT COUNTY §

I, LANCE T. EVANS, do swear that I am worth in my own right at least the sum of \$10,000.00 after deducting from my property all that which is exempt by the constitution and laws of the State from forced sale, and after the payment of all our debts, and after satisfying all encumbrances upon my property which is known to me, and that I reside in Tarrant County, and have property in this State liable to execution worth \$10,000.00.

  
 LANCE T. EVANS, Surety

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this 15TH day of JANUARY, 2010.



  
 Notary Public, State of Texas  
 My Commission Expires: 8/15/2013

CAUSE NO. [redacted]

§ IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT  
 IN RE: §  
 § CITY OF [redacted]  
 [redacted] [name/description of animal] §  
 § [redacted] COUNTY, TEXAS

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled and numbered cause, tried before Honorable Judge [redacted], of the [redacted] [name of city] Municipal Court in [redacted] [name of county] County, Texas, judgment was rendered in favor of the City of [redacted] [name of city], and against [redacted] [owner's name], former owner of [redacted] [name/description of animal(s)], hereinafter, "the animal[s]," divesting ownership of the animal[s] from [redacted] [owner's name] and for court costs under Texas Health & Safety Code § 821.023 in the sum of \$ [redacted], from which judgment [redacted] [owner's name] desires to appeal to the County Court [at Law] of [redacted] County, Texas; and

WHEREAS, appellant desires to suspend execution of said judgment pending determination of such appeal:

NOW, THEREFORE, WE, [redacted] [name of appellant], as principal, and [redacted] [either (name of surety company), a corporate surety company duly qualified and authorized to do business in Texas, or (name) and (name), two good and sufficient sureties], as surety, acknowledge ourselves bound to pay to the City of [redacted] [name], obligee, the sum of \$ [redacted] [amount of bond set by judge], the estimated expenses incurred in housing and caring for the animal[s] while impounded during the appeal process, conditioned, however, that the above-named principal shall prosecute the appeal with effect and shall pay off and satisfy:

(1) the judgment of court costs under Texas Health & Safety Code § 821.023 that may be rendered against [redacted] (him or her) on appeal, as well as

(2) the sum provided by this bond to cover said estimated expenses of housing and caring for the animal[s] during the appeal process, that may be rendered against [redacted] (him or her) on appeal.

WITNESS our hands this date: [redacted] [date].

[redacted] [signature of principal]  
[redacted] [typed name]

[redacted] [signature of surety]  
[redacted] [typed name]  
[redacted] [address]

[redacted] [signature of surety]  
[redacted] [typed name]  
[redacted] [address]

APPROVED AND FILED on date: [redacted].

[redacted]  
JUDGE, MUNICIPAL COURT OF [redacted]  
[redacted] COUNTY, TEXAS

CAUSE NO. 10-78909-2


CITY OF ARLINGTON	X	COUNTY COURT AT LAW
	X	
	X	
V.	X	NUMBER TWO
	X	
	X	
JASON SHAW, VANESA SHAW, and	X	TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
	X	
U.S. GLOBAL EXOTICS, INC.	X	

COURTS ORDER

The Court, after examining and considering the transcript, evidence, audio tape recordings of the Arlington Municipal Court hearing and briefs filed by counsels has determined that the Judgment of the Arlington Municipal Court should be **AFFIRMED** in its entirety.


**IT IS ORDERED** that the order signed by Arlington Municipal Court Judge Michael Smith on January 5, 2010 is **AFFIRMED** in its entirety.

Signed and entered on this 30 day of January, 2010.

  
 JUDGE PRESIDING


# Cruelly-Treated Animal Hearing Process

## BEGINNING THE PROCESS:






**Chapter 821, Subchapter B,  
Health and Safety Code**

## THE HEARING:



## CHOOSE ONE OF THE 3:



**County court decision is FINAL**